

**Independence and Peace for the Vietnamese People !
YANKEE GO HOME !**

NORTH VIETNAM

UP TO MAY 31, 1967

**1,984 U.S. PLANES
DOWNED**

VIETNAM

COURIER

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**SOUTH VIETNAM L.A.F. UNPRECEDENTED VICTORIES
IN WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967**

The L.A.F. :

Foiled Since the Beginning the "Two-Pincer" Strategic Plan of U.S. Dry-Season Counter-Offensive

PUT OUT OF ACTION

175,000 ENEMIES

**Including 70,000 G.I.s and
15,000 Satellite Troops**

**Wiped Out 49 Battalions and Similar Units, Including
28 U.S. Battalions and 1 South Korean Battalion**

**Downed and Destroyed 1,800 Planes and Helicopters,
3,985 Military Vehicles, 100 War Vessels and Motor
Boats and 340 Heavy Guns.**

"THE U.S. and puppet troops not only could not get out of their passive position in the strategic field but were driven to an ever more passive position in the field of operations and combat, their forces were stretched thin everywhere, the figure of 400,000 G.I.'s turned out to be not enough, the disposition of their troops was upset".

(Excerpt from the communiqué of the South Vietnam L.A.F. Command)



Gunners of the L.A.F.

WINTER 1966 SPRING 1967: THE UNCEASED WORK, THE FIRM RESOLVE, THE SOUTH VIETNAM L.A.F. AND PEOPLE IN THE WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967

Speech by Nguyen Van Tien, Head of the Permanent Representation of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, at a press conference in Hanoi on May 30 to make public the communiqué of the South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces on the military achievements of the South Vietnam L.A.F. and people in the Winter 1966 - Spring 1967.

At the beginning of the 1966-1967 dry season, the U.S. military made a bold move about their "strategic counter-offensive" to be launched all over the South Vietnam battlefield. That "counter-offensive" had now ended. It was the second successive large-scale dry season "counter-offensive" since the U.S. expeditionary troops were massively dispatched to South Vietnam to carry out directly the aggressive war.

What hopes did the U.S. put in the second "counter-offensive", how did the U.S. conduct it and what was the result? These are problems that need some clarification.

U.S. PUPPET AND SATELLITE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

When the U.S. launched the second "dry-season counter-offensive" in South Vietnam, the U.S. puppet and satellite forces plus the 7th Fleet directly involved in the battle totaled approximately 1,000,000 men. As far as ground forces are concerned, the U.S. deployed during the 1966-1967 dry season eight divisions of U.S. troops, two divisions of Pak Jung III mercenaries, and 11 divisions of puppet troops, an all in divisions were directly involved in the operations of the 1966-1967 dry season.

Formerly, with only to division, the Japanese fascists could maintain direct control over the South-East Asia. At present, on the small territory of South Vietnam about 70,000 square kilometers, the U.S. has a direct military and political aggressive war. This figure does not include the independent brigades, regiments and battalions of U.S. puppet and satellite forces.

As far weapons and equipment, the U.S. has in South Vietnam over 3,000 heavy artillery pieces, several thousand military vehicles, over 4,300 modern aircraft of different types including about 2,000 out of the total 4,300 helicopters available for the whole of the United States. The U.S. infantrymen are equipped with various kinds of guns described by the U.S. as the most up-to-date in the world, such as M-16, M-79 grenade launchers, which were not yet produced during World War Two.

The U.S. also boasts of its "minigun" equipped in its aircraft that can fire 2,000 rounds per minute and inflict 4,500 casualties in 100 meters. A few minutes, USIS on March 29, 1967, reported that by the end of this year, the quantity of bombs dropped on Vietnam would be 100,000 tons. In the past three years in the European and Mediterranean theatre, besides tens of thousands of tons of toxic bombs, the U.S. has sprayed on villages, fields and orchards in South Vietnam.

With regard to aircraft, in addition to modern supersonic jet fighters, the U.S. has in South Vietnam B-52 strategic bombers which were not yet seen during the Korean war. As far as the naval forces are concerned, the U.S. in the 1966-1967 dry season the U.S. had not mobilized all the 7th Fleet in the Vietnam war, during the recent dry season the whole 7th Fleet and part of the 6th Fleet were involved. Almost all crack forces of the U.S. destined to a conventional war in the mainland were introduced into South Vietnam, such as the 1st Infantry Division which is the pride of the U.S. in terms of division and traditions, the 1st Air Mobile Command, the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. armored brigades and light units provided with big fire power and high mobility.

Almost all the best generals of the U.S. are in South Vietnam, such as Paul D. Harkins, Earl G. Wheeler, Maxwell D. Taylor, Grant S. Sharp, William Westmoreland, and even Lyndon B. Johnson, the President, the under-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, put all their mind on military activities in South Vietnam.

The U.S. decided to increase by from five to seven billion dollars the U.S. aid to South Vietnam, as compared to 25 billion in 1966.

In the 1966-1967 dry season alone the U.S. spent over 10 billion dollars.

With such an enormous quantity of bombs and dollars, the U.S. has perpetrated untold crimes against the Vietnamese people, especially in the last two years since U.S. troops were sent for direct aggression against South Vietnam.

U.S. PLOT IN THE STRATEGIC DRY- SEASON COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

With the abroad military force, the U.S. hopefully launched its second "strategic dry season counter-offensive" (1966-1967) as an attempt to win a big victory on the battlefield so as to bring about a turning point and win a decisive victory in South Vietnam through co-ordinated military, political and deceitful diplomatic activities.

This explains why in this dry season, simultaneously with its military activities, the U.S. staged the election farce in South Vietnam and at the same time sent garrulous politicians to various parts of the world to lead for the U.S. policy in Vietnam. But, while taking this decision the U.S. itself admitted that it could not win easily only by military means and in just dry season.

It was with this strategic intention in mind that in the 1966-1967 "dry season counter-offensive" the U.S. made great efforts to reach the five objectives set by Westmoreland, and so far unattained, that is to use a large military force to create a pincer movement with two prongs - "search and destroy" the main forces of the Liberation Army, and "pacify" the rural areas - with the aim of pushing back the South Vietnam revolutionary forces and creating an advantageous military and political position for the U.S.

Also with this strategic intention in mind the U.S. also tried to intensify its war of destruction in the North. The U.S. hoped that if this strategy could maintain direct control over the South-East Asia. At present, on the small territory of South Vietnam about 70,000 square kilometers, the U.S. has a direct military and political aggressive war. This figure does not include the independent brigades, regiments and battalions of U.S. puppet and satellite forces.

RESULT

Before launching the counter-offensive, the Americans hoped that with such highly mobile forces, and such a huge equipment and means, they could floor the L.A.F. without difficulty. That is why they gave unusual publicity to their "search and destroy" and "pacification" pincers.

Now the dry season counter-offensive has come to its end, the U.S. aggressors dare not claim to have completely wiped out any single brigade of the L.A.F. That is the result of their "search and destroy" operations.

With regard to "pacification" to which the enemy has paid particular attention, the U.S. admitted that there had been no noticeable progress. That is no wonder for the South Vietnamese people. Earlier, Cabot Lodge and Lansdale had tried to pacify the rural areas, but the "pacification" plan, but it had only brought disappointment to the U.S. How then could the new "pacification" plan patched up on the basis of former failure bring to the U.S. something other than more bitter failure?

That is the U.S. failure in the second "dry season strategic counter-offensive" is one in all the political, strategic and tactical fields.

In the political field, with the massive introduction of troops into South Vietnam, the U.S. hoped that the "American presence" would gradually improve the South Vietnam political situation. But, the past two years since the U.S. counter-offensive, the puppet administration has become weaker and the puppet army more powerless, thus the U.S. cannot but lean against a decrepit wall to wage its war of aggression. It must use puppet troops to fight against the U.S. people's capability. That, too, is an impasse for the U.S.

For their part, since the arrival of American troops, the puppet army have seen that the U.S. could not win easily only by military means, and the latter's arrogance toward them.

On the economic field, it needs only to cite just one typical fact: South Vietnam which used to be the granary of Vietnam this year imported over one million tons of rice from the U.S. to meet its needs. The U.S. can in no way "improve South Vietnam's economy" as the U.S. government is carrying on its war of aggression, massacring the people and dislocating the economy of South Vietnam.

On the international arena, the more U.S. troops are sent to South Vietnam, the stronger the movement of protest in the world against the U.S. In the history of the United States, never before has the U.S. sent so many troops to any other country. That Johnson had to send his emissaries abroad again and again to defend the U.S. policy and call back the defeated general Westmoreland to try to calm the unrest in the U.S. Congress and placate public opinion at home which was protesting more and more strongly against the administration for the war in South Vietnam.

Strategically speaking, the most bitter failure of the U.S. is that it could not defeat quickly an adversary having only poor equipment and an underdeveloped economy. Two years and a half have elapsed, yet the U.S. has not won and today no U.S. general dares predict when the war will end. Still another point symptomatic of the U.S. strategic failure: when it began launching massive troops in South Vietnam, the U.S. only thought of offensive. But the present situation in South Vietnam is quite contrary to the U.S. expectation, U.S. troops are in a defensive position all over the South Vietnam battlefield.

The few large-scale "offensives" launched by the U.S. also lie within the framework of the overall U.S. defensive position. They were not offensives of the winning party.

With regard to tactics, the U.S. staked its big tactics on its abundant material means. But what tactics of the U.S. has succeeded so far? If there has been any success, why had the U.S. to change its tactics over and over again?

The "heliborne" tactics was foiled at Ap Bac (early 1963), the "armoured car" tactics was defeated in early 1964 in both Nam Bo and the 12th Interzone, the U.S. "combined strategy" of puppet troops was smashed at Binh Gia (late 1964); the tactics of combined naval, ground and air forces, as in the case of the U.S. at Tan Tuong (August 1965), the "air cavalry" tactics was foiled in the Pleime battle (November 1965). Most recently, the U.S. launched Operation Junction City - the biggest U.S. operation so far in South Vietnam - with the combination of many tactics. However, to the end the U.S. had to terminate the operation without more ado except the rather sensational news that Westmoreland had removed Lieutenant General Seamon, commander of the operation, on the ground that the latter had not fulfilled his mission.

Another failure of the U.S. is that the more U.S. troops enter South Vietnam, the lower their combat efficiency. According to U.S. reports the U.S. troops have suffered 100,000 casualties, the casualty rate of U.S. troops in South Vietnam rose from 7 per cent in 1965 to 12 per cent in 1966 and 14 per cent in 1967.

In short, in the recent Winter-Spring, with over 400,000 U.S. troops that is double the figure in the first "dry season counter-offensive", the U.S. however not only failed to regain the initiative on the battlefield but also was driven into a more passive position. Far from being able to secure the initiative of attack, the U.S. had to patch the force was repeatedly harassed by its opponent and driven into an increasingly defensive position.

That is the significance of the U.S. failure in the second "dry season counter-offensive". That also provides a scientific basis to assert that the U.S. has no other way but to withdraw its troops the U.S. may bring their never changing the political and military situation in South Vietnam in their favour.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WINTER 1966-SPRING 1967 VICTORY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE AND ARMY AND ITS CAUSES

The Winter 1966-Spring 1967 victory is the greatest ever won by the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces and people fighting under the banner of the National Front for Liberation, for national salvation. Compared with

the victory recorded in the Winter 1965 - Spring 1966, the victory achieved this year is bigger in that the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces and people have fought against more than a million enemy troops placed under the command of the strongest ring-leader of imperialism and have defeated all their military manoeuvres. This victory has eloquently demonstrated that the more perfidious the U.S. imperialists are, the closer will be the solidarity of the South Vietnamese people and between the people in both South and North Vietnam, the higher the prestige of the National Front for Liberation, and the firmer the determination of the South Vietnamese people to fight and to win.

In fact never before has the determination to wipe out the Yanks and puppets been so firm in South Vietnam. It is the determination of all the 17 million people and is found in every part of South Vietnam. It is the reflection of the enthusiasm and optimism of the South Vietnamese people and their firm confidence in the final victory. It explains why for all their manoeuvres the only thing the U.S. and quibblers obtained was that they had won the "minds and hearts" of a handful of traitors, whereas the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people remain loyal to the N.F.L., support it and fight to realize their fundamental goal, namely independence, democracy, peace and neutrality with a view to the ultimate reunification of the Fatherland. This position was not only from the working people but also the intelligentsia, national bourgeoisie and religious people, not only from the cities but also the countryside of the Front but also those who for some reason or another are still outside the Front.

This is to achieve the nation-wide unity and win the support of the entire South Vietnamese people in the victory of the South Vietnam revolution under the leadership of the N.F.L.

For the enemy, this big victory of the South Vietnam army and people in this Winter-Spring will certainly speed up the disintegration of the puppet army and administration, and aggravate the isolation of the U.S.

The victory of the South Vietnam armed forces and people will certainly inspire their friends and the world and enhance their confidence in the final triumph of justice. This is proven by the international war crimes tribunal set up by the United Nations, the initiative of Lord Bertrand Russell and won the active support of many well-known personalities in the world, in particular of writer and philosopher Jean Paul Sartre.

It once again demonstrates that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people could win the initiative in attacking the enemy unerringly. More than one million U.S. puppet and satellite troops in South Vietnam.

It is actually with the spirit of daring to fight and defend that the U.S. aggressors that the South Vietnamese people have created many ways of fighting suitable for their conditions in equipment and terrain. As a result, the U.S. has lost three times as many troops as the South Vietnamese revolution have developed and matured rapidly and steadily. Explaining the enemy in spite of their modern means of transport and communication are not so mobile as the Liberation fighters and are attacked everywhere on the battlefields, at their bases, in the towns and cities and during their operations. At present, even American officers admit that there is no safe place for the U.S. in South Vietnam.

The great victory of the South Vietnam armed forces and people in the Winter 1966 - Spring 1967 demonstrates the fact that the U.S. in South Vietnam people continue to develop their courage in face of the enemy of the nation, be it the strongest and wealthiest power, the imperialist camp. This victory demonstrates the correct leadership of the N.F.L., the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnam people. It demonstrates the boundless love of the 17 million comrades in North Vietnam for their kith and kin in the South, who have spared no effort and stop at no sacrifice for the liberation of South Vietnam. The armed forces and people of both zones are standing shoulder to shoulder in resistance to U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

To the call of the North the South springs forward. This is the counter-blow dealt to the U.S. of aggression by the North Vietnam army and people who have so far shot down nearly 3,000 U.S. planes have smashed and greatly contributed to the Winter-Spring victory of the South Vietnamese army and people.

The Winter-Spring victory of the South Vietnamese people and army is inseparable from the support from their friends throughout the world including the American people, especially the people of the brother socialist countries, the Cambodian people under the clearheaded leadership of Head of State Norodom Sihanouk and the Lao people who are fighting under the leadership of Prince Souphavanna against the U.S. imperialists - the common enemy of the Indo-Chinese peoples.

In the cause of liberation of their country, the South Vietnamese people still must win many difficulties and hardships because U.S. imperialism with its inherent stubbornness by nature, still harbours many plots to intensify the war.

Ready to Rush Onward and Win Still Greater Victories

The defeat of the U.S. aggressors in this Winter-Spring is not only manifested by their heavy losses on the battlefield. It is also illustrated in salient features by the complete fiasco of the U.S. aggressors' objectives in their second dry-season counter-offensive plan at the moment when they found themselves in an ever more passively during the whole period of and even after this Winter-Spring. To realize their two pincers "search and destroy" and "pacification", the U.S. aggressors mobilized more than one million troops, launched tens of thousands of operations big and small, including 60 one-division sized operations (three or more divisions) in the last dry season and 3 operations, of the size of a field army corps. They mastered their counter-offensive in every direction. But all their operations were broken down. Major operations brought by them as "the biggest in the war turned out to be their most tragic setbacks. The initiative on the battlefield remained entirely in the hands of the South Vietnam people and their L.A.F. Due to poor efficiency and bad results of their campaigns, the one million odd troops of the U.S. aggressors could not exert any strategic effect, but instead were spread thin and annihilated everywhere. They were not only passive strategically but also ever more isolated politically and militarily.

Westmoreland's picture in this dry season was that of a defeated general moving his troops in disorder, behind his daily and painstaking work of "living from hand to mouth", and only capable of dismissing his officers and asking for more rescue troops. To this picture must be added the near-brash-laments at the end of the dry season over the ever-increasing U.S. casualties which reached record figures. This is proof that over

But this decidedly cannot shake the unwavering stance of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation to fight and to win as expounded in its statement on March 29, 1967. This stand is the just cause of the present sacred struggle of the South Vietnamese people. It is the aspiration of the 17 million people of South Vietnam.

With the impetus of the recent Winter-Spring victory, the South Vietnam armed forces and people with great enthusiasm are proudly marching forward under the "Determined to Win" banner, sure of their full ability to smash all new manoeuvres and acts of the U.S. aggressors. They will certainly win still greater victories.

one million aggressor troops could "search and destroy" nothing but were themselves being destroyed and making frantic efforts to avoid being annihilated in large numbers.

The "pacification" pincer planned by the U.S. aggressors was pitifully broken, on per cent of the puppet regiments, a portion of the U.S. and satellite troops, forty thousand cruel thugs named "pacification cadres", bombs and bullets, noxious chemicals and extremely barbarous methods of war were unable to subdue the South Vietnam rural population. "Pacification" operations conducted by the U.S. and its lackeys were frustrated one after another by continual attacks on all fields. Pulling back the puppet troops for "pacification" task only accelerated their collapse: 50,000 of them including 20 battalions and 145 companies were wiped out thereabouts. The number of deserters amongst the puppet army kept on swelling. Many of them were resentful of the U.S. aggressors and acted according to the requirement of the N.F.L. Five thousand "pacification cadres" i.e. cruel thugs were wiped out. The South Vietnam liberated areas were maintained and even expanded in certain zone. The dismissal of the whole Cabot Lodge, Fortner, Lansdale group is the very avowed by the U.S. aggressors of their bitter fiasco in the "pacification" programme.

The stabilization of the puppet army and administration is but a day-dream of the invaders. Acute contradictions amongst the U.S. quislings who are staging the "elections" farce and especially the scrambling between the two chief traitors of the U.S. in the time of nearly one million tons of rice this year by the Saigon puppet administration, the mounting opposition of the U.S. aggressors in the U.S. Congress, the lackeys, speak clearly of the bankruptcy experienced by the U.S. aggressors in their aim of stabilizing Saigon puppet administration.

The U.S. new rungs of war escalation against North Vietnam have received well-deserved return blows. Hanoi and Huphong repeatedly won resounding victories. Steelies North Vietnam is strikingly engaging in the emulation to down the 2,000th U.S. aircraft. Both zones of Vietnam get still more united in the common anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation. Each further rung of their escalation in North Vietnam plunges the U.S. aggressors into ever heavier defeat both militarily and politically in either zone of Vietnam.

They become more isolated in the international arena. Johnson's peace ravine and emissaries cannot cover up the war-like and aggressive face of the U.S. imperialists.

It is obvious that the U.S. failure in this Winter-Spring is an all-around one. Failure in military and political fields, failure in both South and North Vietnam. This is the first time in which the U.S. bandits were knocked down in their limited war strategy. Much significant is that their setbacks at the time of their landing of their limited war strategy into a serious deadlock. After a two-year test of strength and the U.S. aggressors have been exposed and preparing forces on two occasions, they can give no excuse for their present fiasco. Such failure reveals that the U.S. aggressors are being repudiated by neo-colonialism cannot confront the revolutionary war of the heroic people of Vietnam.

The situation faced by the U.S. aggressors becomes more and more desperate. They are trembling at the first showers of the rainy season. But the most terrific misfortune for them is that no new reinforcements can be sent to the stalemate. They are incapable of either spending up or dragging the war. But their obvious aggression is still urging expeditionary troops and dollars into their dirty war of aggression and pillage. New crises, difficulties and hardships, but we are resolved to fight until complete victory. Our hands are raised by one or several hundred thousand additional American troops can in no way save the U.S. from defeat.

The great victories scored during the past Winter-Spring are creating for the anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation of the Vietnamese people a very strong impulse forward. They are creating a new high tide for new fights and win still greater victories.

With a hand-grenade, M. at 10m
Nguyen van Tien destroys an M. at 10m

SOUTH VIETNAM L.A.F. UNPRECEDENTED VICTORIES IN WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967

COMMUNIQUE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM
L.A.F. COMMAND

TO date, our South Vietnam armed forces and people have been striving for seven months to carry out the appeal issued by the President of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation for a victorious Winter-Spring.

This was a period when the U.S. aggressors with the greatest numerical strength and abundance in weapons took the most frenzied and cruel acts in an attempt to implement a great perfidious

strategic plan dubbed the "two-pincer" plan.

But it was also a period when our South Vietnam armed forces and people, bringing into full play revolutionary heroism and overcoming great difficulties and obstacles, fought fierce battles and won unprecedentedly big victories:

1. According to still incomplete data, in seven months from October 1966 to April 1967, our South Vietnam armed forces and people annihilated 178,000 enemies

(70,000 U.S., 10,000 satellite and 98,000 puppet troops). The enemy units wiped out comprised 49 battalions and corresponding units, among them, 27 infantry battalions (8 U.S., 1 South Korean and 18 puppet battalions), 16 armored squadrons (12 U.S. and 4 puppet), 3 U.S. artillery battalions, 1 puppet engineer battalion, 230 companies, among them 225 infantry companies (71 U.S., 9 South Korean and 145 puppet), 3 U.S. artillery companies and 352 platoons.

The war means destroyed

by our armed forces and people included: 1,800 aircraft shot down or destroyed, 3,085 military vehicles of various types, among them, 1,785 armored cars, 200 ships and combat barges, 140 artillery pieces, 2 trains, 31 locomotives and 60 wagons destroyed.

Our armed forces and people also annihilated 200 military posts, 6 military sub-sections, and destroyed nearly 270 bridges. In comparison with the Winter 1965-Spring 1966, the enemy casualties in the Winter 1966-

Spring 1967 increased by 60,000, the number of naval craft destroyed by nearly 4,000, the number of armored vehicles destroyed increased by more than 5 times and a half, and the number of the total enemy strength at the beginning of the Winter-Spring (September 1966), our armed forces and people annihilated nearly one fourth of U.S. and satellite troops, nearly one fifth of puppet troops, more than one fifth of the number of enemy battalions, nearly half the number of aircraft and nearly 70 percent of the number of armored cars.

By continual attacks and violent counter-attacks our armed forces and people smashed all enemy operations, big and small, and inflicted on the aggressors very heavy losses.

Right at the beginning and during the last Winter-Spring, the Liberation armed forces mounted powerful assaults, skillful ambushes and violent shellings on all theatres of operations. They wiped out many main force units of U.S., satellite and puppet troops. One enemy battalion after another was wiped out in the provinces of Quang Tri, Rach Gia, Quang Nam, Long An, Ben Tre, Binh Thien, Binh Dinh, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Binh Thuan, Gia Dinh, Bac Lieu, Thua Mot, Ha Ria, etc., not a single month passed without scores of enemy companies and platoons being wiped out.

Our armed forces made deep and strong thrusts into a series of logistic bases, airfields, stores, sectors, sub-sectors, provincial and district towns and positions which are part of enemy complexes which are annihilated many enemy effective and destroyed great quantities of war means. A major part of the enemy's rear area offered thus no security and many highways were cut or threatened. 25 airfields were subjected to a total of 45 attacks. Enemy military bases in big cities, provincial towns and subsectors as Saigon, Hue, Bac Lieu, Ben Tre, Thu Dau Mot, Phan Thiet, Kontum, Ho An, Quang Tri were the targets of attacks by our armed forces. It is to be noted that many places beside Saigon and in its periphery and the airbases of Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were attacked, which resulted in heavy losses for the aggressors, the big ammunition depot in Long Binh and the navigation on the Long Tan river were attacked again and again, big amounts of ammunition and many naval craft were destroyed. The Pleiku and An Khe airfields were not spared. The airfields of Da Nang, Chu Lai and ammunition depots in Quang Nam were also subjected to repeated violent attacks which resulted in heavy damage.

The most salient feature is that our people and armed forces in Quang Tri, Thua Thien and many other places from the plain to the mountain areas launched continual

attacks on the enemy in his bases, venturing in contested areas or into our bases. We attacked the aggressors' highways and inflicted on them heavy defeats, driving them to a passive position and ignominious quagmire. To the great joy of our South Vietnam people and Liberation armed forces, the heroic People's Army powerfully shelled the U.S. heavy artillery positions in Gio Linh, knocking out thousands of U.S. aggressors, as punishment for their frantic artillery bombardments of the North.

Wherever the U.S. troops came and established an enclave, they fell at once into a network of arrows, bullets and baby traps of the guerrillas. The bells to wipe out G.I.'s are wearing down the American forces.

In addition to attacks on the enemy, our people and armed forces mounted violent counter-attacks. According to still incomplete figures from December 1966 to March 1967, the U.S. and puppet troops started thousands of operations involving guerrilla attacks or more in an attempt to destroy our bases and wear down the Liberation armed forces, and also to support the pacification teams. Besides, mention should be made that tens of thousands of one- or two-company operations. Most of these were prolonged and unprecedently fierce ones.

In particular, many operations were carried out on the largest scale. In addition to 60 operations of division size, the enemy launched three operations of field-army corps size. In all important operations, the U.S. troops played the main role while the puppet troops entrusted with auxiliary duties accounted only for 10 to 30 per cent of the total strength involved. Recently the U.S. aggressors trampling underfoot international law

made a new serious step in intensifying and expanding the war: they sent some tens of thousands of troops into the demilitarized zone, south of the Ben Hai river, to threaten our countrymen and threaten the North.

However all the operations conducted by the U.S. puppet and satellite troops were defeated by the combined action of our main force units, regional troops and guerrillas. It is noteworthy that our armed forces and people dealt them the most telling blows and inflicted on them the heaviest losses right in the areas considered to be the most important ones, where they mustered big forces and big amounts of war means, and nurtured great ambitions: the area north of Saigon, the plains of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh, the Sa Thay river valley in the High Plateaux, the northern part of Quang Tri province, etc. In particular, north of Saigon in the so-called "iron triangle" and war zone C, the enemy launched successive major operations which all were defeated: *Attitude, Code, Fall, Gadsden, Tricking and Judicious City*. The last operation which was the biggest and most important one in the last dry season as well as in the whole process of the war ended in the heaviest and most thorough defeat the enemy has ever sustained.

Confronted everywhere with the continual attacks and counterattacks of our armed forces and people, the U.S. and puppet troops not only could not get out of their passive position in the strategic field but were driven to an ever more passive position in the field of operations and combat, their forces were stretched thin everywhere, the figure of 400,000 G.I.'s turned out to be not enough, the disposition of their troops was upset.

They planned to bring one U.S. division into the Mekong delta, but managed to send in only one brigade. Several U.S. brigades dispatched from the High Plateaux to the plains of Central Tran and Ba had to be brought back. Three U.S. brigades which had just suffered heavy losses at the hands of our armed forces and people in Central Trung Bo and Eastern Nam Bo had to move hurriedly to Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, from where the U.S. marines were sent to Quang Tri and Thua Thien to be beaten by our armed forces and people.

3. Our armed forces and people defeated the rural "pacification" programme to which the U.S. aggressors and their puppets attach the greatest importance in 1967. Under enemy plans, 90 per cent of the puppet army, part of U.S. and satellite troops and big amounts of money are to be devoted to this end and the programme is to be carried out in an extensive and perfidious way, closely combining military attacks with rural pacification. Their purpose was to destroy the guerrilla movement, to wreck our political bases, to win over the population, to occupy part of our densely populated and rich liberated areas, to cause additional difficulties to our resistance war, and at the same time to gain some political and military assets. In this rural pacification campaign, the U.S. satellite and puppet troops have acted in the most savage and inhuman manner, which aroused indignant condemnation from the whole of mankind. In some places they conducted operations involving tens of thousands of troops to forcibly regroup the people. They used all kinds of barbarous weapons to massacre and intimidate civilians and destroy their means of livelihood: B52's, steel pellet

bombs, napalm, phosphorus and magnesium bombs, flame-throwers, toxic chemicals, etc. They burnt down whole forests, razed to the ground entire villages and destroyed towns with bulldozers, and exposing hundreds of thousands of our countrymen to misery and diseases. Marching behind the bayonets and rifles of the U.S., puppet and satellite troops are 40,000 pacification agents, with their deception, terrorism and coercion. But the brute force of the enemy was unable to shake the dauntless spirit of the heroic South Vietnamese people and the valiant Liberation armed forces. On the contrary, with the increased vigour instilled by deep hatred, the people and armed forces meted out to them well-deserved punishment. We inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in the course of many operations of support for pacification teams. In Operation Cedar Falls, 3,000 U.S. troops were annihilated mainly by the reports of regional troops, militiamen and guerrillas. In Ben Tre, Long An and My Tho, our people and armed forces inflicted heavy losses on the U.S. aggressors. Recently the U.S. and puppet troops who entered the southern part of the demilitarized zone to herd the people suffered 3,000 casualties in only 4 days. By using puppet troops for "pacification" work, the U.S. aggressors nourished the hope that they might escape the fierce blows of our armed forces but over the last 7 months, 20 puppet battalions and 145 puppet companies were wiped out. Our people and armed forces, especially regional troops and guerrillas have combined armed activities with political struggle and political agitation among enemy troops and annihilated many pacification agents and troops. According to still incomplete figures, in 3 months (from December 1966 to February 1967), we wiped out about 5,000 of them. Many conscripts who had been forcibly settled in enemy-controlled areas left the concentration camps to return to their native villages. In the Mekong Delta, a U.S. priority target for pacification, our countrymen still live and fight dauntlessly under the banner of the Front. Generally speaking, although the enemy could at times and in some places cause difficulties to our compatriots in their life and production work, the whole enemy's programme of rural pacification has sustained heavy failure. Our liberated areas are still maintained, and even broadened in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The U.S. rulers in Saigon and Washington have had to admit this defeat.

In a word, over the last 7 months, the U.S. aggressors tried to take advantage of the dry season which offered very favorable conditions for their military activities. They used 400,000 U.S. troops, doubled the figure for the last dry season, and the front ranks of some of modern weapons to strike at us in numerous fields in an attempt to win significant successes to reverse the tide which was more and more unfavourable to them, to secure a position of force and to impose on us a surrender. But the front ranks of some political settlement or to go on intensifying and extending the war of aggression. But the heavier and more acute their defeat, their "two-pincer" plan has sustained initially heavy failure. Their hopes have been frustrated, their situation is worsening, they have been driven to more passive positions and are more seriously bogged down. The pursuit of their "two-pincer" plan is encountering more and more difficulties.

In contrast, during the last Winter-Spring, emitting the North, our great rear to which we are linked by ties of close union, and coordinating our activities with it, our South Vietnamese people and armed forces showed a very firm determination, they did not flinch at acute difficulties, they fought bravely, launched continual attacks and recorded the most glorious feats of arms. We have won initial victories against both enemy strategic schemes as embodied in their "two-pincer" plan. We have won initial victories against the enemy strategic force consisting of nearly one million U.S., satellite and puppet troops, along with all their strategy and tactics. We have won initial victories against enemy infantry, modern weapons and techniques and all new tricks of theirs. Our forces are getting ever stronger and more powerful as the fight goes on.

THE U.S. aggressors are still stubborn and are hatching many new schemes. They will intensify and extend the war at an accelerated tempo, 1967 is of the most important significance in the resistance of our people and armed forces against the Liberation armed forces—main force units, regional troops and guerrillas—nature this significance and pushing forward their victories, launch continual attacks on the enemy, completely smash his "two-pincer" plan, and win even greater victories for the sake of the left and sacred cause of liberating the South, defending the North and achieving national reunification.



Guerrillas making
sphinxed pits.

•3,000 G.I.'s Put Out of Action at KHE SANH •2 Puppet Battalions Wiped Out in CHO LON and QUANG TRI

KHE SANH

3,000 G.I.'s Put Out of Action

GPX (L.P.A.) reports that in the successive engagements at Khe Sanh (Quang Tri province) from April 24 to May 21, 1967, the L.A.F. put out of action 3,000 enemies (including 2,850 G.I.'s killed) and captured many others, downed 11 planes, destroyed 13 military vehicles and 3 ammunition dumps and seized a big quantity of arms and war material.

In particular, on Hills 861 and 881 the number of U.S. casualties was 3,000 Marines. Regiments No 3 and 9 were beaten hollow and the effectiveness of their companies were reduced by 50 per cent. Day and night, helicopters made an aerial bridge between Khe Sanh - Dong Ha and Phu Bai to pick up G.I. corpses. At Phu Bai alone, up to 700 G.I. corpses were put into pouches in a day and piled up to be shipped to the U.S.A.

QUANG TRI

One Enemy Battalion Put out of Action

On May 20, after a 20 minutes' engagement, the L.A.F. swiftly wiped out the C.P. of a relief company, 2 infantry companies, decimating another infantry company, killing or wounding 250 enemy troops, capturing 50 others pertaining to Battalion 3, Regiment 1, Division 1 of the puppet army garrisoned 6 kilometres east of (Quang Tri provincial capital).

HUE

Powerful Attack on the Centre of the City

On May 20, 1967 the L.A.F. launched several waves of powerful attacks on the centre of Hue, a major city in the northernmost part of South Vietnam, according to Western sources. The L.A.F. rounded the residential quarter of the American advisers, the C.P. of the puppet army sub-sector, a club reserved for officers and other military services. The shelling damaged the wire of the Voice of America relay post. The L.A.F.'s shock troops directly assaulted the Huong Giang Hotel, the biggest in Hue reserved for the G.I.'s. 60 per cent of the building was destroyed, U.P.I. reported.

QUANG NAM

Long-Term Counter-Battle: 3,000 Raiders Put out of Action

BETWEEN April 21 and May 13, the L.A.F. countered a long-term

enemy operation to "pacify" the Western part of Quang Nam, and put out of action after several waves nearly 3,000 enemy troops mostly U.S. Marines, shot down 33 planes or helicopters and seized quantity of arms.

PLEIKU

On the morning of May 20, the L.A.F. intercepted and wiped out nearly a company of some 150 G.I.'s of U.S. Infantry Division 4 operating west of Pleiku. According to the U.S. military spokesman in Saigon this is the 6th attack by the L.A.F. on that infantry division within the past 9 days.

CHO LON

One Puppet Battalion Wiped out, 9 Positions Razed to the Ground

To defend their life-line between Chu Lai and Da Nang, the U.S. deployed quite a big force on this section of Highway 1. On a 7-kilometre portion from the Ba Ren bridge to the Ru Bi bridge (13km southeast of Da Nang) they set up three strongholds: Ba Ren, Moc Bai and Huong An.

In addition, the U.S. and puppet troops launched frequent "search and destroy" raids along the road in an attempt to check the activities of the regional forces and guerrillas who had over and again cut the road in many places and harassed enemy patrols, causing frequent interruptions to the enemy traffic.

In the small hours of May 14, the L.A.F. in Cho Lon attacked 5 positions of Battalion 2, puppet Division 25, of a security company and a platoon of "pacification cadres". After a 12 minutes' fight, the L.A.F. completely annihilated this battalion, killing or wounding 250 enemies, including a major, commander of the unit and 4 American advisers. This is the 4th battalion wiped out in Cho Lon since early 1967.

TRA VINH - VINH LONG

In 17 days, between April 24 and May 13, the guerrillas and regional forces of Tra Vinh and Vinh Long provinces razed to the ground 14 positions and forced the enemy to withdraw from there, killed or wounded 268 puppet troops. The population in this area rose up to destroy the "strategic hamlets". More 3,000 people were liberated.

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE FORCES VIE WITH EACH OTHER IN SHOOTING DOWN THE 2000th U.S. PLANE

HAIPHONG Downs the 100th Plane

Of late the Command of the A.A. defence and air force has launched an emulation drive for the downing of U.S. aircraft on the spot and the 2,000th American plane in the North. The unit which will down the greatest number of planes since the 1,000th plane downed on May 17 will be commended together with the unit that will down the 2,000th plane. This decision

has received the warm response from all A.A. defence forces in all localities of North Vietnam.

Between August 5, 1964 and May 31, 1967, 1,084 American planes were shot down over the North.

Also in this shooting emulation movement, Haiphong brought down on May 26 planes which were the 100th and most planes downed by this city.

Many American War Vessels Set Afire

Over the last few days, many American war vessels which came and shelled the seacoast of North Vietnam were set afire by the coastal defence batteries of the V.P.A.

On May 24 Vinh Linh set afire 1 war vessel.

On May 25 Vinh Linh and Quang Binh set afire 2 war vessels.

On May 25 Ha Tinh sank 1 commando ship.

On May 26 Thanh Hoa set afire 1 war vessel.

On May 27 Vinh Linh damaged the destroyer *Edson* of 2,850 tons, injuring 20 Yankees on board, according to Western reports. The same news agencies reported that the American vessel burnt on May 25 by Vinh Linh coastal defence was the destroyer *Providence*.

On May 29, Thanh Hoa damaged another American war vessel.

Since February 26, 1967, American war vessels have been set on fire 31 times and many commando ships sunk

BA REN - HUONG AN, CEMETERY OF U.S. ARMoured CARS

On March 24, 1967 a convoy of 200 U.S. military trucks went from Chu Lai to Da Nang, carrying weapons and equipment to reinforce the U.S. defence of this major base.

Because of the importance of this supply mission the U.S. commanders had taken all precaution to ensure its

safety. From early morning U.S. and puppet troops from the strongholds along the road had been sent out for patrol while U.S. reconnaissance planes scoured the area over and over again. They even took a measure of diversion by sending an advanced convoy of about 30 vehicles. This convoy met

with no resistance. Yet the U.S. commanders were far from feeling secure. They sent Battalion 13 of the puppet Regiment 51 to take up position at the Ba Ren bridge, reinforced the puppet garrison at Thanh Binh district capital (4 km south-east of Huong An) and ordered the artillery units at Thanh Binh and Duy Xuyen posts to stand at the ready to provide cover for the on-coming convoy. In the skies scores of American aircraft including armed helicopters L-19 reconnaissance planes and jet fighters roared back and forth to detect any possible movement of the L.A.F. and also to keep up the morale of the troops in the convoy. The tank-sapper, they also sent mine detectors and high-pressure tankers to go some distance ahead of the convoy, followed by armoured cars and support units. An engineer battalion of puppet Army Corps was on the look-out, ready to repair any possible damage to the bridge and road.

With such precautions the U.S. thought it could make safe travel on the most dangerous portions of the road from Chu Lai and Da Nang and reach destination before nightfall. But they met with a stinging rebuff. The local guerrillas and regional armed forces right from the outset gave combat to the armoured column, causing it to slow down considerably and move with great difficulty until it fell into an ambush laid by the Liberation Armed Forces at the time chosen by the latter.

At 17.50 hrs the leading car struck a mine as it reached the southern edge of



Armoured car destroyed

(Continued page 7)